Philosophers have recently argued that self-fulfilling beliefs constitute an important counter-example to the widely accepted theses that we ought not and cannot believe at will. Cases of self-fulfilling belief are thought to constitute a special class where we enjoy the epistemic freedom to permissibly believe for pragmatic reasons, because whatever we choose to believe will end up true. In this paper, I argue that this view fails to distinguish between the aim of acquiring a true belief and the aim of (...) believing what is true. While one cannot usually fail to establish that one will acquire a true belief without establishing the truth of the believed proposition, in the case self-fulfilling belief the two can come apart. I argue that insofar as the aim of belief has to do with determining whether the believed proposition is true, it will be both impossible and impermissible to believe for pragmatic reasons. (shrink)

This paper considers the relationship between evidence and self-fulfilling beliefs—beliefs whose propositional contents will be true just in case—and because—an agent believes them. Following Grice, many philosophers hold that believing such propositions would involve an impermissible form of bootstrapping. This paper argues that such objections get their force from a popular but problematic function-model of theoretical deliberation, and that attending to the case of self-fulfilling belief can help us see why such a model is mistaken. The paper shows that on (...) a revised model of theoretical deliberation our evidence will problematically underdetermine any appropriate doxastic attitude: when belief in a proposition is self-fulfilling, our evidence is insufficient to support belief, disbelief, or even suspended judgment toward that proposition. (shrink)

This paper considers the relationship between evidence and self-fulfilling beliefs. Following Grice (1971), many philosophers hold that adopting a self-fulfilling belief would involve an impermissible form of bootstrapping. I argue that such objections gets their force from a popular but problematic model of theoretical deliberation which pictures deliberation as a function, treating the deliberation’s inputs as given, fixed prior to and independently from the deliberation. Though such a picture may seem plausible, attending to the case of self-fulfilling beliefs can help (...) us see how such a function-model is inadequate for a general understanding of theoretical deliberation. Because it is unable to accommodate the possibility that the outcomes of our deliberation can sometimes be evidence for the proposition we are deliberating about, the function model is unable to account for cases where what we believe affects the truth of what is believed. (shrink)

Just as the existence of practical akrasia has been treated as important evidence for the existence of our practical agency, the alleged absence of epistemic akrasia—cases in which a believer believes some proposition contrary to her considered judgments about what she has most reason to believe—has recently been marshaled as grounds for skepticism about the existence of similar forms of epistemic agency. In this paper, I defend the existence of epistemic agency against such objections. Rather than argue against the impossibility (...) of epistemic akrasia, I argue that the impossibility of epistemic akrasia is actuallycompatible withthe existence of epistemic agency. The crucial mistake, I argue, is that skeptics about epistemic agency are failing to distinguish carefully between differences in the structure of believing and acting and differences in the structure of normative reasons to believe and normative reasons to act. I show that once these ‘environmental’ differences are properly distinguished, we can see that absence of epistemic akrasia provides no reason to doubt that practical and epistemic agency are on a par with one another. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the concepts ‘destination’, ‘revelation’, ‘foreknowledge’, ‘will’, ‘transmission’, ‘motion’, and ‘grace’, as they appear in Gregory Palamas’ treatise De opera-tionibus divinis. According to the Christian theologian, these terms correspond to specific ways of God’s manifestation, i.e. His natural and supernatural revelation. Since they illuminate God’s energies, but not His essence, they are participated by the beings of the natural world. The first two terms mainly refer to a general version of the revelation, while the third (...) contains epistemological elements as well and the fourth contains elements referring also to the divine will. The fifth term condenses the content of the afore-mentioned terms seen as an ad extra bestowment. By means of these concepts, Palamas preserves the ontological difference between the supernatural and the natural, while, at the same time, he defines the exact way of their communion, which excludes pantheism. He introduces into the divine realm the state of distinction, which, however, does not restrict its unity at all. He accepts the development of a metaphysical multitude, which is regulated by the divine uniqueness. What emerges is not a kind of Neoplatonic polytheism, but the infinite richness of the divine existence. Thus, Palamas steadily moves within the tradition founded by Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene, and George Pachymeres, the main characteristic of which is ontological monism. This is a tradition which formulated common places as to the content, the concepts and the relevant methodology, while the distinction between negative and affirmative theology is dominant. (shrink)

Physics matters less than we once thought to the making of Mendel. But it matters more than we tend to recognize to the making of Mendelism. This paper charts the variety of ways in which diverse kinds of physics impinged upon the Galtonian tradition which formed Mendelism’s matrix. The work of three Galtonians in particular is considered: Francis Galton himself, W. F. R. Weldon and William Bateson. One aim is to suggest that tracking influence from physics can bring into focus (...) important but now little-remembered flexibilities in the Galtonian tradition. Another is to show by example why generalizations about what happens when ‘physics’ meets ‘biology’ require caution. Even for a single research tradition in Britain in the decades around 1900, these categories were large, containing multitudes. (shrink)

With Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri reinvigorated debates in political theory and radical philosophy about the cultivation of revolutionary subjectivity. Their theorization of Empire and multitude has also significantly affected the tenor of critical approaches to educational theory during the past two decades. In this article, we discuss Hardt and Negri’s contribution to what we call the biopolitical turn in educational theory, emphasizing the influence of autonomist Marxism on their work. Even more specifically, we discuss the impact of the (...) autonomist tradition on their formulation of the nature of the relationship between the multitude and Empire: that the multitude is the generative force of the social world, whereas Empire is merely an apparatus of capture. This autonomist approach reveals a set of questions regarding subjectivity, materialism, and social ontology, which we argue are ripe for engagement by educational theorists, and indicate the enduring relevance of Empire as a valuable text for educational theorists interested in matters of biopolitical production, collective opposition, and revolutionary subjectivity. (shrink)

Suppose that Paul, while looking at a tree, sees that that thing over there is a red bird. Paul is having what we may call a ‘singular’ perceptual experience. How should we characterise the representational content of his perceptual experience? I will sketch an original answer to this question, building on the internalist accounts propounded by Searle (1983. Intentionality. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 2) and Recanati (2007. Perspectival Thought. Oxford University Press. Ch. 17). Pace Searle, the content of Paul's experience (...) is not a (general) proposition. Pace Recanati, whose account draws on Lewis’s (1979. “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se.” Philosophical Review 88 (4): 513–543) internalist view of de se attitudes, it is not a property of the perceiving subject. Instead, I submit, it is a property of the perceived object. The content is the property of being a red bird, which determines a set of centred worlds whose centre (an object taken at a time) is a red bird; the object (here, the bird) is part of the relevant situation of evaluation for the experience; and the experience is veridical only if the actual world centred on the object belongs to the set of centred worlds determined by that property. I will argue that this view retains the benefits of Searle's and Recanati's accounts while improving on them. (shrink)

Mounting evidence shows that nature contact is associated with affective benefits. However, the psychological mechanisms responsible for these effects are not well understood. In this study, we examined whether more time spent in nature was associated with higher levels of positive affect in general, and lower levels of negative affect and rumination in general. We also conducted a cross-sectional mediation analysis to examine whether rumination mediated the association of nature contact with affect. Participants reported their average time spent in nature (...) each week, as well as their general levels of positive and negative affect, and the degree to which they typically engaged in rumination in daily life. We then used structural equation modeling to test our hypotheses. Our results support the hypothesis that nature contact is associated with general levels of affect, and that rumination mediates this association for negative affect, and marginally mediates this association for positive affect. (shrink)

This paper develops a semantic account of morphological number marking, specifically in the presence of numerals. In addition to accounting for number marking on basic nouns like _book_ in English, the account handles variation in patterns of number marking along two dimensions: cross-linguistically, between languages that either necessitate or prohibit singular morphology in the presence of numerals greater than ‘one’; and within one and the same language on the various nominal elements in English. Building off the presuppositional approach to morphological (...) number from Sauerland (Proc SALT 13:258–275, 2003), the proposed semantics accounts for both sorts of variation by assuming flexibility in the selection of the measure relevant to the one-ness presupposition of the morphological singular form. (shrink)

We explored the differential impact of auditory information and written contextual information on the recognition of verbal irony in spontaneous speech. Based on relevance theory, we predicted that speakers would provide acoustic disambiguation cues when speaking in situations that lack other sources of information, such as a visual channel. We further predicted that listeners would use this information, in addition to context, when interpreting the utterances. People were presented with spontaneously produced ironic and nonironic utterances from radio talk shows in (...) written or auditory form, with or without written contextual information. When the utterances were read without written contextual information, all utterances were rated as equally ironic. But when they were heard as opposed to read, or when they were presented in irony-biasing contexts, originally ironic utterances were rated as more sarcastic than originally nonironic utterances. This evidence suggests both acoustic and contextual information are used when inferring ironic intent in spontaneous speech, and validates previous manipulations of intonation in studies of irony understanding. (shrink)

Many supporters of ‘moral bioenhancement’, the use of biomedical interventions for moral improvement, have been criticised for having unrealistic proposals. The interventions they suggest have often been called infeasible and their implementation plans vague or unethical. I dispute these criticisms by showing that various interventions to implement MBE are practically and ethically feasible enough to warrant serious consideration. Such interventions include transcranial direct current stimulation over the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, as well as supplementation with lithium and omega-3. Considering (...) their efficacy and feasibility, it is strange that these interventions have rarely been proposed or discussed as MBE. I review evidence that each of those interventions can reduce antisocial behaviour, reduce racial bias, increase executive function or increase prosocial traits like fairness and altruism. I then specify and defend realistic, ethically permissible ways to implement these interventions, especially for violent offenders and public servants—the former as rehabilitation and the latter to meet the high standards of their occupations. These interventions could be given to violent offenders in exchange for a reduced sentence or compulsorily in some cases. Potential intervention methods for non-prisoners include increasing the USDA-recommended dose of omega-3, encouraging food companies to supplement their products with omega-3 or trace lithium, requiring MBE for employment as a police officer or political leader, and insurance companies providing discounts for undergoing MBE. In some reasonably limited form, using these interventions may be a good first step to implement the project of MBE. (shrink)

Many discussions of J. S. Mill's concept of liberty focus too narrowly on On Liberty and fail to acknowledge that his treatment of related issues elsewhere may modify its leading doctrines. Mill and Paternalism demonstrates how a contextual reading suggests that in Principles of Political Economy, and also his writings on Ireland, India and on domestic issues like land reform, Mill proposed a substantially more interventionist account of the state than On Liberty seems to imply. This helps to explain Mill's (...) sympathies for socialism after 1848, as well as his Malthusianism and feminism, which, in conjunction with Harriet Taylor's views, are central to his later discussions of the family and marriage. Feminism, indeed, is shown to provide the answer to the problem which most agitated Mill, overpopulation. Thus Gregory Claeys sheds new lights on many of Mill's overarching preoccupations, including the theory of liberty at the heart of On Liberty. (shrink)

Contents: 1. Razón del presente estudio -- 2. La formación del Derecho -- 3. Ortega y el Derecho natural -- 4. Ortega y el espíritu popular o "Volksgeist" -- 5. El Derecho y la Moral -- 6. Derecho y ley positiva -- 7. Colofón.

Resumo: Analisaremos o conceito foucaultiano de governamentalidade e os seus impactos sobre a memória. Veremos como aquilo que Foucault chama de governo contém em si uma forma específica de conduzir os sujeitos ao exame das próprias consciências, direcionando-as para um objetivo pré-estabelecido. Trataremos de explicitar a articulação entre memória e reflexão a fim de verificarmos como o sujeito que examina a sua própria consciência é um sujeito que reflete, essa reflexão, no entanto, quando influenciada pelo governo, se torna aquilo que (...) chamaremos de flexão. Em seguida, veremos como a flexão é um modo particular de memória da sociedade competitiva, uma memória que contém em seu íntimo a competitividade. Por fim, indicaremos os impactos da flexão na memória e, por conseguinte, na educação. Palavras-chave: Governamentalidade; Memória; Reflexão; Flexão; Consciência. Governmentality and memory: when reflection becomes flexion Abstract: We will analyze the foucauldian concept of governmentality and its impacts on memory. We will see how what Foucault calls government contains in itself a specific way of leading subjects to examine their own consciences, directing them to a pre-established objective. We will try to explain the articulation between memory and reflection in order to verify how the subject who examines his own conscience is a subject who reflects, this reflection, however, when influenced by the government, becomes what we will call flexion. Next, we will see how flexion is a particular mode of memory of the competitive society, a memory that contains competitiveness in its heart. Finally, we will indicate the impacts of flexion on memory and, therefore, on education. Key-words: Governamentality; Memory; Reflection; Flexion; Consciousness. Gubernamentalidad y memoria: cuando la reflexión se convierte en flexión Resumen: Analizaremos el concepto foucaultiano de gubernamentalidad y sus impactos en la memoria. Veremos cómo lo que Foucault llama gobierno contiene en sí mismo una forma específica de llevar a los sujetos a examinar sus propias conciencias, orientándolos hacia un objetivo preestablecido. Intentaremos explicar la articulación entre memoria y reflexión para verificar cómo el sujeto que examina su propia conciencia es un sujeto que reflexiona, esta reflexión, sin embargo, al ser influida por el gobierno, se convierte en lo que llamaremos flexión. A continuación, veremos cómo la flexión es un modo particular de memoria de la sociedad competitiva, una memoria que contiene la competitividad en su seno. Finalmente, indicaremos los impactos de la flexión sobre la memoria y, por tanto, sobre la educación. Palabras clave: Gubernamentalidad; Memoria; Reflexión; Flexión; Conciencia. Data de registro: 05/05/2022 Data de aceite: 26/10/2022. (shrink)

Este trabajo propone abordar, desde el enfoque de Juan Duns Escoto, los actos cognoscitivos humanos, concretamente el conocimiento por intuición y por abstracción, y dejar planteada la vinculación con la especie inteligible y el contendido intencional de la misma. Para ello, se centrará principalmente en el análisis de la Quaestio Quodlibetal xiii, en la que Escoto desarrolla uno de los nudos problemáticos más innovadores de su noética, a saber: la diferencia entre los actos mentales intuitivos y abstractivos, por un lado, (...) y entre especie inteligible y contenido mental, por otro. Para tal propósito, este escrito se organiza en tres partes, las cuales no coinciden necesariamente con el modo de exposición del texto de Juan Duns Escoto, sino que se presenta como un posible recorrido de abordaje exegético de la compleja cuestión. El análisis interpretativo de los pasajes centrales y de las tesis que en ellos se arguyen se apoya en los estudios actuales que hay respecto de la noética escotista, tratando de dejar en evidencia tanto los puntos de acuerdo como los de conflicto respecto de qué entiende Escoto poractos cognoscitivos, su relación al objeto y qué quiere decir cuando habla de especie inteligible y contenido intencional. (shrink)

Este escrito se inscribe dentro de la teoría extática del amor según Duns Escoto, la que está influenciada por la doctrina de San Anselmo respecto de las dos inclinaciones o afectos de la voluntad: la affectio commodi y la affectio iustitiae. El objetivo del mismo es mostrar cómo Juan Duns Escoto logra superar la aparente contradicción que cabe entre tender por naturaleza a Dios y elegir a Dios a partir de la reflexión sobre los dos afectos que conforman la voluntad (...) humana. (shrink)

Cuando se habla de literatura y filosofía, generalmente se hace referencia a campos totalmente distintos, con producciones enteramente diferentes. Algunos textos parecen pertenecer de manera exclusiva ya sea al ámbito de la filosofía o de la literatura, como si no pudiera haber hibridación; como si lo que fuera de un campo no pudiera ser leído en la clave del de otro. En este sentido, cabe preguntarse si una obra considerada literaria podría leerse filosóficamente y cómo.

El trabajo aborda el aparente conflicto que cabe entre la omnipotencia divina y la libertad humana. La tesis que subyace en la posición de Duns Escoto es que ni la omnipotencia divina ni la gracia que infunde suprime la determinación interior de la voluntad humana. Por el contrario, la omnipotencia divina se revela como amor y libertad, y es así que el hombre viene al ser desde el amor y la libertad divina que lo sostiene y configura. Es decir, la (...) libertad es el fundamento de todo lo creado, y desde esa misma lógica, el ser humano es esencialmente libre. (shrink)

The first part of the book investigates Nietzsche's knowledge and understanding of specific disciplines and the influence of particular scientists on Nietzsche ...

In this paper, I seek to caution the increasing number of contemporary sociologists who are engaging with continental phenomenological sociology without looking at the Anglo-American tradition. I look at a particular debate that took place during the formative period in the Anglo-American tradition. My focus is on the way participants sought to negotiate the disciplinary division between philosophy and sociology. I outline various ways that these disciplinary exigencies, especially the institutional struggles with the sociological establishment, shaped how participants defined phenomenological (...) sociology. I argue that despite the supposed theoretical, methodological, and substantial differences between these waves of phenomenological sociology, the contemporary wave could benefit from some of the lessons that were learned by their predecessors. (shrink)

This research examines how an organization, Thanksgiving Coffee, establishes and maintains its legitimacy with its constituent publics. In line with Boyd’s (2000, Journal of Public Relations Research12(4), 341–353.) concept of actional legitimacy, Thanksgiving Coffee demonstrates a legitimation strategy addressing social issues and by responding to ethical and political questions. Applying Fisher’s (1984, Communication Monographs51, 1–18) concepts of narrative fidelity and probability, Thanksgiving Coffee’s policies and communication activities were found to alleviate the social issues to which they were addressed and therefore (...) reinforce perceptions of legitimacy among publics. Viewing the influence of organizations from a different perspective, this study provides an example of how the policies of an organization can have a positive impact on the broader society in which it operates. (shrink)

La pregunta sobre la muerte sigue siendo una gran preocupación para el hombre de hoy. La concepción bantú-africana de la muerte y el más allá ofrece una original respuesta a este misterio. Presentar la coincidencia y diferencias de dicha original respuestas con otras respuestas posibles será el objetivo de esta reflexión.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Visions of Damietta:St. Francis, Robert Grosseteste, and the Crusades, 1219–1253Rosamund M. Gammie (bio)A peculiar and under-explored event in Robert Grosseteste's (d. 1253) life is that of his supposed dream-vision in 1249, reported posthumously and in only one source, the Lanercost chronicle.1 The vision foreshadows the loss of Damietta in Egypt the following year, during the Seventh Crusade (1249–54) under the leadership of Louis IX. The parallels to St. Francis's (...) vision at Damietta in 1219 during the Fifth Crusade (1215–21) are immediately noticeable yet the vision has remained largely dismissed as an afterthought in the scholarship of Grosseteste. Considering that Grosseteste wrote, in 1236, what has been described by Michael Lower as "surely the best defence of the cross petition a crusader ever had," in addition to his association with the Franciscans and his relationship with Richard, earl of Cornwall, brother of Henry III and nephew of celebrated crusader Richard I and a (if not the) principal leader of the Baron's Crusade, it is surprising that there is no fuller account of his support for the movement; rather there are piecemeal references to certain acts of interference such as that noted by Lower.2 This paper seeks to establish Grosseteste's position on the crusades, in light of a thoroughly Franciscan influence, beginning with Damietta. [End Page 141]Robert Grosseteste and the FranciscansMuch has been written about the relationship between Robert Grosseteste and the early Franciscan movement in England.3 As Giles Gasper writes in a recent study of Grosseteste and the Franciscan school at Oxford, "Robert Grosseteste is well-known for his support for the Franciscan order, and his warm relations with many brothers of the English province."4 James McEvoy concludes in his examination of Grosseteste's affinity with the nascent movement that "there can be no doubt that Grosseteste was well acquainted with the personality and ideals of St. Francis, the circumstance of the Franciscans' foundation, and the nature of their vocation."5 Grosseteste's Letters are full of admiration for the Franciscans and involvement in their affairs, so much so that a clear and uncompromisingly affectionate relationship can be traced during the bishop's lifetime. Indeed, Grosseteste, in Letter 41, ca. 13 March, 1236, declares to Elias of Cortona, third minister of the Franciscan Order, that "there are no assistants I know of … so effective as your friars."6 The Friars themselves reciprocated their love for Grosseteste; the same letter states, "your sons, the Friars Minor in England, out of kindness in a special way embrace me tightly with arms of love." A letter from 1238 (Letter 58) to Pope Gregory IX asks for help in preserving the reputation of the Brothers, who "illuminate our whole land with the brilliant light of their preaching and teaching" with the warning that "the glory of such an important religious order will vanish and the masses will be scandalized in them."7 [End Page 142]The Dominican Brother Hubert perhaps best expresses the affection between the religious orders and Grosseteste, writing the celebratory Life of Grosseteste shortly after the bishop's death in 1253.8 According to Brother Hubert, Grosseteste was the "father and guardian" of both orders, whose presence "pleased him, as did their / Arrival, their multitude, and frequent conversation," and that just "as a mother to her new-born, he fostered, loved / Protected, fed, and valued them."9 Gasper continues, "English Franciscan historiography leaves no doubt as to the high esteem in which the order held Grosseteste from the mid-13th century onwards, honored in particular for his teaching and learning."10 Chosen personally by Agnellus of Pisa to teach the first Franciscans at Oxford, his influence cannot be underestimated. Indeed, there were Franciscan (and Dominican) contributions to the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to canonize the bishop; a ten-lined letter from Nicholas, guardian of the Greyfriars at Lincoln, penned on 26 June, 1289, extolls the exemplary actions of the bishop.11The relationship between Grosseteste and this first generation of Franciscans was one of mutual respect and love. What is harder to trace is Grosseteste's appreciation of St. Francis himself. When Servus Gieben asks... (shrink)

(2013). Malebranche and Chinese Philosophy: A Reconsideration. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 262-280. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.718869.

Despite the rekindling of an often bitter debate as to the meaning of Martin Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism, little has been done to address afresh the texts themselves of the period in question and the problematic to which Heidegger conceived he was applying himself. Defying Enlightenment universalism, Heidegger asserts that meaningful human existence requires a belonging in a particular historical community whose integrity must be sustained in what he calls “Auseinandersetzung,”---confrontation. This paper attempts to show how “Auseinandersetzung,” itself Heidegger’s (...) translation of the Greek word “polemos,” underlies central concepts of Heidegger”s ontology, influencing his views on work, art, and great creators. The current controversy lends us an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of fascism and the foundation for politics in a global era. (shrink)

Today political theorists and the public generally often associate descriptive representation with democracy. However, in Victorian Britain supporters of descriptive representation tended to be arrayed against democracy. The impression that democracy was incompatible with descriptive representation and a set of related values, primary among which was deliberation, formed one of the great obstacles which democratic theory faced in this period. These values belonged to a traditional theory of representation which held that Parliament ought to be a mirror of the nation (...) in its diversity and which judged democracy, in contrast, to be an illiberal mode of regulating the franchise because it risked handing the representation wholly to one part or class within society. In response to this school of thought, democratic theory developed two conflicting responses: first, that democracy could accommodate social and ideological diversity; second, that democracy was irreconcilable with the goal of mirroring diversity, but that nevertheless democracy had to be preferred on grounds of fairness and non-arbitrariness. (shrink)

There exists substantial cultural variation in how emotions are expressed, but there is also considerable evidence for universal properties in facial and vocal affective expressions. This is the first empirical effort examining the perception of vocal emotional expressions across cultures with little common exposure to sources of emotion stimuli, such as mass media. Shuar hunter-horticulturalists from Amazonian Ecuador were able to reliably identify happy, angry, fearful and sad vocalizations produced by American native English speakers by matching emotional spoken utterances to (...) emotional expressions portrayed in pictured faces. The Shuar performed similarly to English speakers who heard the same utterances in a content-filtered condition. These data support the hypothesis that vocal emotional expressions of basic affective categories manifest themselves in similar ways across quite disparate cultures. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:WORKS OF FICTION AND ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS by Gregory Currie ii O peech act theory is remarkably unhelpful in explaining what ficOtion is." So says Kendall Walton.1 My purpose here is to showjust how wrong diis judgment is. Not that I want to endorse all die attempts there have been to connect fiction with the notion of a speech act. Elsewhere I have argued diat the most prominent attempt (...) at such a theory, the one due to John Searle, fails.2 But my complaint is not mat Searle employs the idea of a speech act; rather it is that he employs it in too half-hearted a fashion. The idea of Searle and odiers is diat to write fiction is not to perform a speech act, but rather to pretend to do so. I, on the odier hand, take the view that the writer of fiction engages in an act of speech diat is distinctively fictional, and distinctively different from speech acts such as asserting, requesting, questioning, and so forth. What follows is a much simplified account of this idea.3 Following die program of Strawson and Grice, I believe diat the different kinds of speech acts are to be individuated in terms of the utterer's intentions.4 The intention of the one who asserts is to get a certain kind of response; perhaps to get the audience to believe the proposition asserted.5 The one who commands wants the audience to obey, die requester wants the audience to answer, etc. And in all these cases the utterer intends to get the response partly as a result of the audience's recognition of diat very intention. (This is the familiar Gricean mechanism.) The utterer of fiction, on the odier hand, wants to get the audience to make-believe die proposition uttered.6 Thus we have an act structurally similar to 304 Gregory Currie305 paradigmatic speech acts like asserting, commanding, and requesting (die structural similarity being given by the use in all cases of the Gricean intention ), but differing from diese odiers with respect to die content of the utterer's intention. Let us call such an act a.fictive illocutionary act. Pursuing this line in more detail leads to an intuitively satisfactory taxonomy of speech acts which places the uttering (usually writing) of fiction fully widiin die purview of the theory, rather dian shutting it off to one side as a pseudo-performance, as widi Searle. Is such a theory susceptible to the objections diat Walton brings? Walton is quite right to say (and here I suppose he has Searle in mind) that fiction is not simply the absence ofillocutionary force: "it is something positive, something special" (p. 79). As already indicated, my theory gives a positive account of fiction as a special kind of speech act. But Walton presses the issue further by suggesting that the essence of fiction has nodiing to do with die absence of assertive force. It is possible, he says, "to make an assertion by writing fiction." His point is not merely that fictional stories are sometimes told in order to get across some serious but not explicit point — everyone can agree to that. It is rather diat fictional works contain explicit assertions — e.g., some of Tolstoy's sentences about Napoleon in War and Peace — and that a fiction might contain nothing but assertions. He imagines a genre of historical fiction in which "authors are allowed no liberties with the facts, and in which they are understood to be asserting as fact whatever they write" (p. 80). Let us grant that this is a possibility. What, dien, would distinguish a piece of fiction belonging to this genre from, say, a work of historical scholarship? The answer comes when we see that the same utterance can be used to perform more than one illocutionary act. Thus if I say to someone "I have no money" it may be that I want him both to believe that I have no money and to give me the goods on credit. And in both cases I intend to get die desired responses via his recognition of my intentions. The same utterance can count both as an assertion... (shrink)